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SUPREME COURT REVIEW (1972)
was convinced of guilt.6 0 Majorities of less than
three-fourths could be called into question in the
future.61
60 406 U.S. at 362.
61 Montana permits jury verdicts of 3 in nonfelony
cases. MONT. CONST. art. 11I, §23. The federal Consti-
tution incorporates majorities of Y4 for ratification of
Constitutional amendments, U.S. CONST. art. V, and
Y3 for ratification of treaties, id. art. II, §2, impeach-
ment, id. art. 1, §3, and declaration of presidential dis-
ability, id. amend. XXV, §4, as substantial majorities.




Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972)
In Kastigar v. United States' the Supreme Court
held that use immunity' is constitutionally suffi-
dent to compel an unwilling witness to testify over
a claim of the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination and that transactional im-
munity3 is not required. Petitioners in Kastigar
were held in contempt' for refusing to answer ques-
tions before a federal grand jury after they had
been granted use immunity.5 In the contempt pro-
' 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
2 "Use" immunity merely prohibits prosecutorial use
and derivative use of compelled testimony; the witness,
however, may be prosecuted for a crime to which the
compelled testimony relates if the evidence used against
him is acquired from a source independent of the com-
pelled testimony. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S.
at 453 (1972).
3 "Transactional" immunity provides complete im-
munity from future prosecution for any crime to which
the witness' testimony relates. Counselman v. Hitch-
cock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
4The contempt order was issued pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §1826 (1970). Under similar circumstances, the
seventh circuit reversed a contempt citation, reasoning
that Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892),
required a grant of "transactional immunity." In re
Korman, 449 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd sub norn.
United States v. Korman i 406 U.S 952 (1972).5Immunity was granted pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§6002 (1970), which states: -
Whenever a witness refuses on the basis of his
privilege against self-incrimination to testify or
provide other information in a proceeding before
or ancillary to
1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
2) an agency of the U.S., or
3) either House or Congress... the person pre-
siding over the proceeding communicates to the
witness an order issued under this part, the witness
may not refuse to comply with the order on the
basis of his privilege of self-incrimination; but no
testimony or other information compelled under
the order (or any information directly or indirectly
derived from such testimony or other information)
may be used against the witness in any criminal
case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false
statement, or otherwise falling to comply with the
order.
ceeding and before the Supreme Court, the peti-
tioners contended that use immunity was not co-
extensive with the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion and, therefore, was unconstitutional.'
In affirming the lower courts, the Supreme Court
recognized the long-settled principle that a grant of
immunity must be coextensive with the privilege
against self-incrimination which it supplantsY In
holding that use immunity satisfies this require-
ment, the Court stated:
The privilege has never been construed to mean
that one who invokes it cannot subsequently be
prosecuted. Its sole concern is to afford protection
against being "forced to give testimony leading
to the infliction of penalties affixed to... crim-
inal acts." Immunity from the use of compelled
testimony and evidence derived directly and
indirectly therefrom affords this protection.8
The majority expressly disavowed the dictum in
Counselman v. Hitchcock' which stated that an im-
munity statute must provide absolute immunity
against future prosecutions concerning matters
about which the witness had testified: 0 In dissent,
Justices Douglas and Marshall argued that Caun-
selman should be followed and that a grant of
absolute immunity is constitutionally required to
compel testimony over a claim of the fifth amend-
ment privilege." justice Marshall also argued that
the safeguards against prosecutorial use of com-
6The petitioner contended that only transactional
immunity was coextensive with the fifth amendment
privilege and, therefore, was the only constitutionally
permissible grant of immunity.
7The coextensive standard was first formulated in
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
8 406 U.S. at 453 (footnotes'omitted).
9 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
10 Id. at 585-86. See text accompanying note 20
infra.1406 U.S. at 467,471.
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pelled testimony described in the majority opinion
were illusory.'
2
Kastigar comes in the wake of a long line of cases
extending the scope of the fifth amendment privi-
lege and the requisite amount of immunity re-
quired to supplant it. The Supreme Court's initial
confrontation with the problems raised by a witness
who refuses to testify despite a statutory grant of
immunity was in Counselman v. Hitchcock." In that
case, Counselman was adjudged in contempt14
for refusing to answer grand jury questions after
he had been granted immunity." On appeal, the
Supreme Court held that Counselman's refusal
to testify was proper because the immunity granted
was not coextensive with the scope of the privilege
against self-incrimination which the grant pur-
portedly supplanted.'
6
The statute in Counselman provided that no
"evidence obtained from a party or witness by
means of judicial proceeding... shall be given in
evidence, or in any manner used against him... in
any court of the United States ...... 1" The C(ourt
construed the statute as affording a witness protec-
tion only against the use of the specific testimony
compelled and not from the derivative use
thereof." Although the Court found the statute
unconstitutional because it was not coextensive
with the privilege by virtue of its failure to provide
derivative use immunity, it also stated the follow-
ing in dictum:
[N]o statute which leaves the party or witness
subject to prosecution after he answers the
criminating questions put to him, can have the
effect ol supplanting the privilege conferred by
the Constitution of the United States.... [A]
statutory enactment, to be valid must afford
absolute immunity against future prosecution for
the offense to which the question relates."
2 Id. at 468-69.
3 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
1 In re Counseman, 44 F. 268 (7th Cir. 1890).
16 Immunity was provided under the Act of February
25, 1868, ch. 13, 15 Stat. 37.
16 142 U.S. 547, 585 (1892).
"7Act of February 25, 1868, ch. 13, 15 Stat. 37.
is142 U.S. at 564. The Court found that under this
construction, the statute:
could not and would not, prevent the use of his
testimony to search out other testimony to be
used in evidence against him or his property, in a
criminal proceeding in such court. It could not
prevent the obtaining and the use of witnesses and
evidence which should be attributable directly to the
testimony he might give under compulsion, and on
which he might be convicted, when otherwise, and
if he had refused to answer, he could not possibly
have been convicted.
19 Id. at 585-86.
Following the Counselman decision, Congress en-
acted the Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893.20
In an effort to meet the "coextensive" requirement
of Counselman, Congress included in the statute
the Court's advisory language that "absolute im-
munity against future prosecution" is constitu-
tionally mandated. The Act therefore provided:
"[N]o person shall be prosecuted.., for or on ac-
count of any transaction, matter or thing, concern-
ing which he may testify .... "2
The 1893 Act became the model for all later
federal immunity legislation." Mr. Justice Frank-
furter noted in Ullmann v. United States" that trans-
actional immunity had become part of the nation's
constitutional fabric.24 Prior to Kastigar, transac-
tional immunity seemingly had become imbedded
in American federal jurisprudence.
In 1964, however, the Supreme Court rendered
two decisions concerning state immunity grants
which seemed to alter the extent of immunity
needed to satisfy Counselman's "coextensive" re-
quirement. T- 1'"a!loy v. Hogan,"5 the Court held
that the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination was applicable to the states through
the fourteenth amendment. This decision over-
ruled Twining v. New Jersey,26 which held that the
fifth amendment privilege did not apply to the
states. Under Twining, any protection afforded an
individual by a state through a grant of immunity
was gratuitous on the part of the state rather than
required under the federal constitution. After
Malloy the "coextensive" requirement of Counsel-
man was determinative of the constitutionality of
state immunity statutes."
In Murphy v. Waterfront Commission," the
second case, the Court rejected the doctrine that a
state grant of immunity did not extend protection
beyond the borders of the immunizing state. Prior
to Murphy a state grant did not prevent subse-
lu Act of February 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443. This
statute was repealed by the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, §245, 84 Stat. 922,
931 (codified in scattered titles and sections of U.S.C.).
" Act of February 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443.
22 See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMSSION ON REFORM OF
FEDERAL CRluNAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS 1444-45
(1970).
350 U.S. 422 (1956).
21Id. at 438.
5 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
26 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
2In Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Commission of
Investigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1972), the Court held that
the coextensive formula of Counsdman is satisfied by
state statutory immunity from use and derivative use.
378 U.S. 52 (1964).
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quent prosecution by the federal government 9 or
by sister states.20 This result followed because
states, lacking a grant of power comparable to the
supremacy clause," are unable to give their im-
munity statutes extrajurisdictional effect.
In Murphy, petitioners refused to testify on the
ground that their answers might tend to incrimi-
nate them under federal laws to which the im-
munity granted them by the states did not purport
to extend.n They were adjudged in contempt.P On
appeal to the Supreme Court, the issue was whether
one jurisdiction within the federal structure may
compel a witness, whom it has immunized from
prosecution under its laws, to give testimony which
might then be used by another jurisdiction not
bound by the immunity grant.u
After considering the federal precedents support-
ing the "two sovereign rule" that testimony may be
compelled by one jurisdiction and used by
another,35 and finding that "there is no continuing
legal vitality to, or historical justification for the
rule," as Justice Goldberg, speaking for the Court,
concluded that the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination protects a state witness against
incrimination under federal as well as state law and
a federal witness against incrimination under state
as well as federal law." 7 To provide this protec-
tion, the Court proscribed the federal government
from using the state-compelled testimony and its
fruits.88 The Court found that this exclusionary
rule permits states to secure information necessary
2 See, e.g., Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958)
which held that state grants of immunity did not reach
the federal government. See also Feldman v. United
States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944), holding that federal courts
could admit evidence that had been compelled under a
state grant of immunity.
30 The state courts are split as to the effect of immuni-
zation under the laws of another state. McCoRmUxC,
EVIDENCE §124 (1954).
2 By virtue of the supremacy clause, U.S. CoNsT.
art. VI, §2, federal statutes prevail over any contra-
vening state law. Therefore, under a federal grant of
immunity a witness is protected against subsequent
prosecution by both federal and state authorities.
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). See generally
Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507 (1960); Ullman
v. United States 350 U.S. 422 (1956); Adams v. Mary-
land, 347 U.S. 19 (1954).
2 See notes 29-31 and accompanying text supra.3 Application of Waterfront Commission, 39 N.J.
436, 452-58, 189 A.2d 36, 46-49 (1963).
24 378 U.S. 52, 54 (1964).
35 See note 29 supra. See also United States v. Mur-
dock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931); Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S.
372 (1905).
36 378 U.S. 52, 77 (1964).
7 Id. at 77-78. See generally, Hofstadler "& Levittan,
Immunity and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination-
Too Little and Too Much, 39 N.Y.S.B.J. 105 (1967).
as378 U.S. at 79.
for effective law enforcement yet 'leaves the wit-
ness and the Federal Government in substantially
the same position as if the witness had claimed his
privilege in the absence of a state grant of immu-
nity." 89
While the Court in Murphy reaffirmed the con-
stitutional requirement of coextensiveness an-
nounced in Cotnselman, it did not hold that an im-
munized state witness must be immune from fed-
eral prosecution. 4 Justice Goldberg ignored those
statements in Counselman that transactional im-
munity is required, and read that case to mean that
immunity statutes must protect a witness from the
derivative use of his compelled testimony.4 1
The Court in Kastigar v. United States, consistent
with what it felt was the reasoning and result of
Murphy, established in sweeping terms that use
immunity is coterminous with the fifth amendment
privilege and sufficient to replace it.Y In dissent,
Justice Douglas argued that Murphy did not re-
strict the Counselman requirement of transactional
immunity. Rather, he regarded the Murphy deci-
sion as an attempt to deal with the problems cre-
ated by federalism.4 He felt that since Murphy did
not expressly overrule Counselinan, the Counselinan
formula for coextensiveness remained valid in
intrajurisdictional (single sovereign) settings, while
the Murphy formula applies to interjurisdictional
(dual sovereign) situations.
Justice Douglas' reasoning was based on the be-
lief that the threat of future prosecution is sub-
stantial when a single sovereign can first compel
incriminating testimony and later bring prosecu-
tion, whereas when the jurisdiction bringing the
prosecution differs from the jurisdiction that com-
pelled the testimony, the threat of prosecution may
fade.44 This argument, however, ignores the exist-
39 Id. Although none of the opinions in Murphy di-
rectly considered the problem of a non-immunizing
state bringing prosecution subsequent to a grant of im-
munity by a sister state, the majority opinion did state
that the Court was abandoning "the rule that one juris-
diction within our federal structure may compel a wit-
ness to give testimony which could be used to convict
him of a crime in another jurisdiction." Id. at 77. If this
exclusionary rule is constitutional in origin, then it
should apply to state as well as federal courts.
10 Of course, the Murphy Court was not faced with
the issue of transactional immunity. The petitioner in
that case did not contend that a state's grant of im-
munity should simultaneously grant federal transac-
tional immunity. Rather, the contention was that
states cannot grant immunity.
41378 U.S. at 78, quoting Ceunselman v. Hitchcock,
142 U.S. 547, 564 (1892).
42406 U.S. at 458, citing Murphy v. Waterfront
Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
43 406 U.S. at 463-64.
11 Id. at 464.
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ence of cooperation between state and federal
authorities in conducting criminal investigations.
Additionally, immunity legislation need only be
functionally equivalent to the fifth amendment
privilege which it replaces. As the majority opinion
notes, the Murphy conclusion that prohibition of
use and derivative use "leaves the witness and the
Federal Government in substantially the same
position as if the witness had not testified" 4 5
demonstrates that Court's belief that use immu-
nity and the fifth amendment are coextensive. If
the exclusionary rule enunciated in Murphy is
constitutionally sufficient in a dual sovereign set-
ting, then there is no constitutional reason for re-
taining, in any context, the stricter standard of
Counselman.41 An argument that a dual sovereign
situation presents different considerations than a
single sovereign setting is not based upon consti-
tutional consideration but rather upon administra-
tive expediencies. It confuses the need for ad-
ministrative restraint with the constitutional scope
of the privilege.
Mr. Justice Douglas also argued that in Albertscn
v. Subversive Activities Control Board,47 a single
sovereign situation, the Court, in striking down an
immunity statute, cited Counselman4s while Mur-
phy was not mentioned. While it is true that the
Court in Albertson did cite Counselman language,
as the Kastigar majority notes49 the immunity
statute involved was held insufficient because it did
not preclude "any use of the information called
for ... either as evidence or as an investigating
lead." "o This is the standard set forth in Murphy.
The Court next addressed petitioners' contention
that the exclusionary rule will prove impossible to
enforce. Petitioners contended, and Justice Mar-
shall agreed in dissent, that a witness would have to
depend on the integrity and good faith of the prose-
cuting authorities for the information relevant to
the question of taint."' The Court, quoting from
Murphy, however, meets this objection by shifting
the burden of proof on the issue of taint:
"Once a defendant demonstrates that he has
testified under a... grant of immunity... the
"5 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964).
46 Comment, Witness Immunity Statutes: The Consti-
tutional and Functional Sufficiency of "Use Immunity,"
51 B.U.L. REv. 616, 632 (1971).
4"382 U.S. 70 (1965).
4 Id. at 80.
49 406 U.S. at 455 n.39.
0Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board,
382 U.S. 70, 80 (1965) (emphasis added).51406 U.S. at 468-69.
authorities have the burden of showing that their
evidence is not tainted by establishing that they
had an independent, legitimate source for the
disputed evidence."..... This burden of proof...
is not limited to a negation of taint; rather, it
imposes on the prosecution the affirmative duty
to prove that the evidence it proposes to use is
derived from a legitimate source wholly inde-
pendent of the compelled testimony."
Although the burden of proof is thus shifted, the
majority opinion is insufficient on this point in that
it fails to establish the degree of proof required in
order for the government to meet its burden. Mr.
Justice Marshall fears that the government could
meet this burden by mere assertion." While the
Court suggests that a higher degree of proof will be
required,- it fails to enunciate what standard will
apply."'
Finally, to further substantiate its holding that
the fifth amendment does not require immunity
legislation to provide transactional immunity but
rather is satisfied by a witness' right to suppress
tainted evidence and its fruits at trial, the Court
compares statutory immunity with the "immu-
nity" that is conferred by an unconstitutional
interrogation.
A coerced confession, as revealing of leads as
testimony given in exchange for immunity, is
inadmissible in a criminal case, but it does not bar
prosecution.' 6
Mr. Justice Marshall found the analogy to be inap-
propriate in that immunity legislation operates in
advance of the interrogation and gives it constitu-
tional approval, whereas in the case of coerced
confessions, the exclusionary rule merely provides
a remedy to the victims of illegal police conduct.
Notwithstanding the differences in these two situa-
tions, as outlined by Mr. Justice Marshall, the
"Id. at 460 (citations omitted), quoting Murphy v.
Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 79 n.18 (1964).
w406 U.S. at 469.
" Id. at 460.
-" One lower federal court has held that "clear and
convincing" is the correct standard. United States v.
Pappadio, 235 F. Supp. 887, 890 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). See
generally Note, In re Koota: The Scope of Immunity
Statutes, 61 Nw. U. L. REv. 654 (1966); Note, Self-In-
crimination and the State: Restriking the Balance, 73
YALE L. J. 1491 (1964).
"1406 U.S. at 461. The Court, id at n.53, quotes
Mr. justice White's concurring opinion in Murphy v.
Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 103 (1964): "A
coerced confession is as revealing of leads as testimony
given in exchange for immunity and indeed as excluded
in part because it is compelled incrimination in viola-
tion of the privilege."
508 [Vol. 63
